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Abstract—Cloud containers represent a new, light-weight alter-
native to virtual machines in cloud computing. A user job may
be described by a container graph that specifies the resource
profile of each container and container dependence relations.
This work is the first in the cloud computing literature that
designs efficient market mechanisms for container based cloud
jobs. Our design targets simultaneously incentive compatibility,
computational efficiency, and economic efficiency. It further
adapts the idea of batch online optimization into the paradigm of
mechanism design, leveraging agile creation of cloud containers
and exploiting delay tolerance of elastic cloud jobs. The new and
classic techniques we employ include: (i) compact exponential
optimization for expressing and handling non-traditional con-
straints that arise from container dependence and job deadlines;
(ii) the primal-dual schema for designing efficient approximation
algorithms for social welfare maximization; and (iii) posted price
mechanisms for batch decision making and truthful payment
design. Theoretical analysis and trace-driven empirical evaluation
verify the efficacy of our container auction algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing offers cloud users with utility-like com-
puting services on a pay-as-you-go fashion [1]. Computing re-
sources including CPU, RAM, disk storage and bandwidth can
be leased in custom packages with minimal management over-
head. Virtualization technologies help cloud providers pack
cloud resources into a functional package for serving user jobs.
Such packages used to be dominantly virtual machines (VMs),
until the recent emergence of cloud containers, e.g., Google
Container Engine (largest Linux container) [2], Amazon EC2
Container Service (ECS) [3], Aliyun Container Service [4],
Azure Container Service [5], and IBM Containers. Compared
with general-purpose VMs, containers are more flexible and
lightweight, enabling efficient and agile resource management.
Applications are encapsulated inside the containers without
running in a dedicated operating system [6]. A representative
cloud container is only megabytes in size and takes seconds to
start [6], while launching a VM may take minutes. In the era
of using VMs, VMs remain open throughout the life of the
job. Because of the transient nature of a container, jobs could
be seperated into several containers, and resource allocation is
more convenient.
A complex cloud job in practice is often composed of sub-
tasks [7]. For example, a social game server [8] typically
consists of a front-end web server tier, a load balancing tier
and a back-end data storage tier; a network security application
may consist of an intrusion detection system (IDS), a firewall,
and a load balancer. Different sub-tasks require different
configurations of CPU, RAM, disk storage and bandwidth
resources. Each sub-task can be served by a custom-made
container following the resource profile defined by the cloud
user [9]. Some cloud containers are to be launched after
others finish execution, following the input-output relation of
their corresponding tasks. Such a dependence relation among
containers is captured by a container (dependence) graph.
For example, in Amazon ECS, a cloud user submits a job
definition including resource requirements, type of docker
image, a container graph, and environment variables. ECS then
provisions the containers on a shared operating system, instead
of running VMs with complete operating systems [10].
In the growing cloud marketplace (e.g., Amazon EC2 and
ECS), fixed pricing mechanisms [11] and auctions complement
each other. While the former is simple to implement, the latter
can automatically discover the market price of cloud services,
and allocate resources to cloud users who value them the most
[12]. A series of recent cloud auction mechanisms implicitly
aim at non-elastic cloud jobs. These include both one-round
cloud auctions [12] and online cloud auctions [13], [14]. In
both cases, the provider processes each bid immediately and
commits to an irrevocable decision. Furthermore, even in the
online auctions, users’ service time window is predefined by
start and finish times in the bid [13], [14].
A large fraction of cloud jobs are elastic in nature, as
exemplified by big data analytics and Google crawling data
processing. They require a certain computing job to be com-
pleted without demanding always-on computing service, and
may tolerate a certain level of delay in bid acceptance and in
job completion. For example, since Sanger et al. published the
first complete genome sequence of an organism in 1977, DNA
sequencing algorithms around the globe currently produce 15
billion gigabytes of data per annum, for cloud processing [15].
A typical job of DNA testing takes 4 hours to complete, while
the user is happy to receive the final result anytime in a few
days after job submission [16].
Given that bids from cloud users can tolerate a certain
level of delay in bid admission, it is natural to revise the
common practice of immediate irrevocable decision making
in online cloud auctions. We can group bids from a common
time window into a batch, and apply batch bid processing
to make more informed decisions on all bids from the same
batch simultaneously. Actually, if one considers only online
optimization and not online auctions, then such batch pro-
cessing has already been studied in operations research, such
as online scheduling to minimize job completion time [17],
and scheduling batch and heterogeneous jobs with runtime
elasticity in cloud computing platforms [18].
We study efficient auctions for cloud container services,
where a bid submitted by a cloud user specifies: (i) the
container dependence graph of the job; (ii) the resource profile
of each container; (iii) the deadline of the job; and (iv) the
willingness to pay (bidding price). Cloud containers can be
agilely created and dropped to handle dynamic sub-tasks in
cloud jobs; it becomes practically feasible to suspend and
resume a sub-task. As long as a container is scheduled to run
for a sufficient number of time slots, its sub-task will finish.
This work advances the state-of-the-art in the literature
of cloud auctions along two directions. First, while batch
algorithms have been extensively studied in the field of online
optimization, to the authors’ knowledge, this work is the first
that studies batch auctions in online auction design. Second,
this work is the first cloud auction mechanism designed for
container services, with expressive bids based on container
graphs. Our mechanism design simultaneously targets the
following goals: (i) truthfulness, i.e., bidding true valuation for
executing its job on the cloud maximizes a user’s utility, re-
gardless of how other users bid; (ii) time efficiency, we require
that all components of the auction run in polynomial time,
for practical implementation; (iii) expressiveness; the target
auction permits a user to specify its job deadlines, desired
cloud containers, and inter-container dependence relations; and
(iv) social welfare maximization; i.e., the overall ‘happiness’
of the cloud-ecosystem is maximized.
Corresponding to the above goals, our auction design lever-
ages the following classic and new techniques in algorithm and
mechanism design. For effectively expressing and handling
user bids that admit deadline specification and container
dependence graphs, we develop the technique of compact
exponential Integer Linear Programs (ILPs). We transform
a natural formulation of the social welfare optimization ILP
into a compact ILP with an exponential number of variables
corresponding to valid container schedules. Although such a
reformulation substantially inflates the ILP size, it lays the
foundation for later efficient primal-dual approximation algo-
rithm design, helping deal with non-conventional constraints
that arise from container dependence and job deadlines, whose
dual variables are hard to interpret and update directly. A
combinatorial sub-routine later helps identify good container
schedules efficiently without exhaustively enumerating them.
Towards truthful batch auction design, we leverage the
recent developments in posted price auctions [19]. At a high
level, such an auction maintains an estimate of marginal
resource prices for each resource type, based on expected
supply-demand. Then upon decision making of each batch of
bids, it chooses bids whose willingness to pay surpasses the
estimated cost to serve them, based on resource demand of the
container graph and projected marginal prices of resources.
A winning user is charged with such estimated cost, which
is independent from its bidding price. Truthfulness is hence
guaranteed based on Myerson’s celebrated characterization of
truthful mechanisms [20].
The social welfare maximization problem in our container
auction is NP-hard even in the offline setting, with all inputs
given at once. A third key element of our cloud container
auction is the classic primal-dual schema for designing effi-
cient approximation algorithms, with rigorous guarantee on
worst case performance. This is further integrated with the
posted price framework, in that the marginal resource prices
are associated with dual variables. The primal dual framework
relies on a sub-routine that computes the optimal schedule of
a given container graph, based on static resource prices (fixing
dual variables, update primal solution). We apply dynamic
programming [21] and graph traversal algorithms [22], for
designing the sub-routine for (i) service chain type jobs from
network function virtualization, and (ii) general jobs with
arbitrary topologies in their container graphs. We evaluate the
effectiveness of our cloud container auction through rigorous
theoretical analysis and trace-driven simulation studies.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss related work in Sec. II,
and introduce the auction model in Sec. III. The container
auction is presented and analyzed in Sec. IV and Sec. V
separately. Sec. VI presents simulation studies, and Sec. VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There exist a large body of studies in recent cloud comput-
ing literature on cloud auction design. Shi et al. [23] studied
online auctions where users bid for heterogeneous types of
VMs and proposed RSMOA, an online cloud auction for dy-
namic resource provisioning. Zhang et al. [24] propose COCA,
a framework for truthfull online cloud auctions based on
a monotonic payment rule and utility-maximizing allocation
rule. These auction mechanisms are all confined to the solution
space of immediately accepting or rejecting an arriving bid. To
our knowledge, this work is the first that designs batch-type
online auctions, both in the field of cloud computing and in
the general literature of auction mechanism design.
In terms of batch-type online algorithms, Deng et al.
[17] study online scheduling in a batch processing system.
Kumar et al. [18] design scheduling mechanisms for runtime
elasticity of heterogeneous workloads. They propose Delayed-
LOS and Hybrid-LOS, two algorithms that improve an existing
dynamic programming based scheduler. These work possess
a resemblance to ours in terms of postponing immediate
response for more informed decision making, although they
focus on algorithm design only and do not consider payments
or incentive compatibility.
Along the direction of posted price algorithms and mech-
anisms, Huang et al. [25] study online combinatorial auc-
tions with production costs. They show that posted price
mechanisms are incentive compatible and achieve optimal
competitive ratios. Etzion et al. [26] present a simulation
model to extend previous analytical framework, focusing on
a firm selling consumer goods online using posted price and
auction at the same time. This work was inspired in part by this
line of recent developments on using posted prices to achieve
effective resource allocation and bid-independent charges.
III. THE CLOUD CONTAINER AUCTION MODEL
We consider a public cloud in which the cloud provider
(auctioneer) manages a pool of R types of resources, as
exemplified by CPU, RAM, disk storage and bandwidth, and
the capacity of resource-r is Cr. Integer set {1, 2,..., X} is
denoted by [X]. There are I cloud users arriving in a large
time span {1, 2, ..., T}, acting as bidders in the auction. Each
user i submits a job bid that is 4-tuple:
Πi = {Wi, ti, di, Bi}. (1)
Here Wi is the workload of user i, ti is arrival time of user i,
and its required deadline for job completion is di. Bi is user
i’s overall willingness-to-pay for finishing its job by di.
According to users workload, the detailed information will
be obtained by cloud platform. Such as the number of sub-
tasks of the job M, and each sub-task requires a container
to process, thus m is also the number of containers. The
container graph Gi that describes the dependence among sub-
tasks. The number of requested time slots for each sub-task
Nim. Each sub-task can be suspended and resumed, as long
as the total execution time accumulates to Nim. h
r
im is the
resource configuration of containerm of user i.
A (container) schedule is a mapping from resources and
time slots to cloud containers, serving accepted cloud jobs to
meet their deadlines. We postpone immediate decision making
on the bids, to judiciously exploit cloud jobs’ tolerable delays
in bid admission. We group bids from every θ time slots into
a batch, resulting in Q batches within the large time span T.
Let ρq be the number of users arriving within batch q ∈ Q. A
binary variable xi indicates whether user i’s bid is accepted (1)
or not (0). Another binary variable zim(t) indicates whether
to execute user i’s sub-task m at time slot t (1) or not (0); it
encodes a schedule of user i’s job. The cloud provider further
computes a payment Pi to charge for a winning cloud user
i. The holy grail of auction mechanism design is truthfulness,
the property that greatly simplifies bidder strategy space and
analysis of the auction mechanism.
Lemma 1. Let Pr(Bi) denote the probability of bidder i
winning an auction and B−i be the bidding price except i.
A mechanism is truthful if and only if the following hold for
a fixed B−i [28]:
1) Pr(Bi) is monotonically non-decreasing in Bi;
2) bidder i is charged by BiPr(Bi)−
∫ Bi
0
Pr(Bi)dB.
Lemma 1 can be explained in this orientation: the payment
charged to bidder i for a fixed Bi is independent of Bi.
We will use this mode to design a posted price function in
Sec. IV. Since we meet the challenge that when we consider
that online batch auction decisions are to be made based on
hitherto information only. If user i’s job is accepted, its utility
is ui = υi − Pi, which equals ui = Bi − Pi under truthful
bidding. The cloud provider’s utility is
∑
i∈[I] Pi. The social
welfare that captures the overall utility of both the provider
TABLE I: List of Notations
I # of users
T # of time slots
Cr capacity of type-r resource
M # of sub-tasks/containers of one job
Wi workload of user i
Gi dependence graph of user i’s sub-tasks
Nim # of time slots requested by user i’s container m
hrim demand of type-r resource by user i’s container m
ti user i’s arrival time
di deadline of user i’s bid
Bi bidding price of user i’s bid
xi accept the user i’s bid(1) or not(0)
ρq # of users arriving within batch q
fSir(t) total type-r resource occupation of schedule in Γi for slot t
θ # of time slots within one batch interval
zim(t) allocated user i’s container m at time slot t(1) or not(0)
wr(t) amount of allocated type-r resource at time t
yr(t) availablity of type-r resource at time slot t
κr(t) marginal price of type-r resource at time slot t
Fr minimum value of user’s valuation per unit of type-r resource
Dr maximum value of user’s valuation per unit of type-r resource
Γi the set of valid schedules for each user
ui user i’s utility
and the users is (
∑
i∈[I]Bixi −
∑
i∈[I] Pi) + (
∑
i∈[I] Pi).
With payments cancelling themselves, the social welfare is
simplified to
∑
i∈[I]Bixi.
Under the assumption of truthful bidding, the Social Welfare
Maximization problem in our cloud container auction can be
formulated into the following Integer Linear Program (ILP):
maximize
∑
i∈[I]
Bixi (2)
subject to:
θ⌈
ti
θ
⌉xi ≤ tzim(t),∀t,∀m,∀i : ti ≤ t, (2a)
tzim(t) ≤ dixi,∀t,∀m,∀i : ti ≤ t, (2b)
tzim(t) ≤ t
′
zim′(t
′), (2c)
∀t, t′,∀i : task m′ arrives later than task m,
Nimxi ≤
∑
t∈[T ]
zim(t),∀m,∀i, (2d)
∑
i∈[I]
∑
m∈[M]
h
r
imzim(t) ≤ Cr,∀r,∀t, (2e)
xi, zim(t) ∈ {0, 1},∀i,∀t,∀m. (2f)
Constraints (2a) and (2b) ensure that user i’s job is scheduled
to execute only between its start time and deadline. (2c)
enforces inter-task dependence of user i’s sub-tasks, and (2d)
makes sure that the total number of allocated time slots for
each container is sufficient to finish the corresponding sub-
task. Constraint (2e) states that the total amount of type-r
resource utilized at time slot t is capped by system capacity.
Even in the offline setting with all inputs given, ILP (2)
is still NP-hard. This can be verified by observing that with
constraints (2e) and 2(f) alone, and ILP (2) degrades into the
classic knapsack problem known to be NP-hard. We resort
to the classic primal-dual schema [29] for efficient algorithm
design. We first reformulate ILP (2) into an equivalent compact
exponential version, to hide the non-conventional constraints
that arise from container dependence and job deadlines, whose
dual variables would be hard to interpret and to update:
maximize
∑
i∈[I]
∑
S∈Γi
BixiS (3)
subject to: ∑
i∈[I]
∑
S:t∈S
f
S
ir(t)xiS ≤ Cr,∀r ∈ [R],∀t ∈ [T ], (3a)
∑
S∈Γi
xiS ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [I ], (3b)
xiS ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ [I ],∀S ∈ Γi. (3c)
In the compact exponential ILP above, Γi represents a set of
valid schedules for sub-tasks that meet constraints (2a), (2b),
(2c) and (2d). BiS represents the bidding price of user i in
schedule S ∈ Γi. Since a time slot can serve two or more
containers, we let fSir(t) represent the total type-r resource
occupation of user i’s schedule S in t. Constraints (3a) and (3b)
correspond to (2e) and (2f) in ILP (2). We relax the integer
constraints xi ∈ {0, 1} to xi ≥ 0, and introduce dual variable
vectors ui and κr(t) to constraints (3a) and (3b) respectively,
to formulate the dual of the LP relaxation of ILP (3).
minimize
∑
i∈[I]
ui +
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
r∈[R]
Crκr(t) (4)
subject to:
ui ≥ Bi −
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈S
f
S
ir(t)κr(t),∀i ∈ [I ],∀S ∈ Γi, (4a)
κr(t), ui ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [I ],∀r ∈ [R],∀t ∈ [T ]. (4b)
While the reformulated ILP (3) is compact in its form, it
has an exponential number of variables that arise from the
exponential number of feasible job schedules. Correspond-
ingly, the dual problem (4) has an exponential number of
constraints. Even there are exponential number of schedule
options are available, we only select polynomial number of
them to compute the approximately optimal objective through
a sub-algorithm (sec IV-B). We next design an efficient auction
algorithm that efficiently solves the primal and dual compact
exponential ILPs simultaneously, pursuing social welfare max-
imization (in the primal solution) while computing payments
(in the dual solution).
IV. BATCH AUCTION ALGORITHM FOR SOCIAL
WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
A. The Batch Algorithm
Departing from traditional online auctions that make imme-
diate and irrevocable decisions, our auction mechanism takes a
batch processing approach to handle user bids. In each batch,
we aim to choose a subset of bids to accept, and to dynamically
provision containers, through choosing a feasible assignment
of the primal variable xiS . We let xiS = 1, if user i’s bid with
schedule S is accepted, then allocate time slots according to
the schedule, and update the amount of resources occupied.
We now focus on batch bid processing and container
provisioning for social welfare maximization. A set of dual
constraints exists for each primal variable xiS . We minimize
the increase of the dual objective and maintain dual feasibility
(4a) by leveraging complementary slackness. Once the dual
constraint (4a) is tight with user i’s schedule S (KKT condi-
tions [14]), the primal variable xiS is updated to 1. According
to constraint (4b), the dual variable ui ≥ 0. Therefore, we let
ui be the maximum of 0 and the RHS of (4a). If ui = 0, the
bid is rejected.
ui = max{0,max
s∈Γi
(Bi −
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈S
f
S
ir(t)κr(t))},∀i ∈ ρq (5)
κr(t) can be viewed as the marginal price per unit of
type-r resource at t. Consequently,
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈S f
S
ir(t)κr(t))
represents the cost of serving user i by schedule S, and
{Bi−
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈S f
S
ir(t)κr(t)} is the utility of user i’s bid.
The above assignment (5) chooses the schedule which can
maximize the job’s utility..
Our auction strives to reserve a certain amount of resource
for potential high-value bids in the future. Careful implemen-
tation of such an intuition through dual price design is crucial
in guaranteeing a good competitive ratio of the auction.
Let Dr and Fr represent the maximum and minimum
user valuation per unit of type-r resource respectively. wr(t)
denotes the amount of allocated type-r resource at t. We define
the marginal price κr(t) to be an increasing function of wr(t):
κr(wr(t)) =
σFr
k
(
kDr
σFr
)
wr(t)
Cr (6)
where Dr = max
i∈[I]
Bi∑
m∈[M]
Nimh
r
im
; Fr = min
i∈[I]
Bi∑
m∈[M]
Nimh
r
im
.
The initial price of each type-r resource should be low
enough such that any user’s bid can be accepted; otherwise
there might be a large amount of idle resource. Thus we
decrease the starting price by a coefficient k, satisfying: k−1 =
maxr∈[R] ln(
kDr
σFr
) and k > 1. The detailed explanation of k
is given in Theorem 5. For all wr(t) < Cr , κr(t) < Dr, and
it will reach Dr when wr(t) = Cr. In that case, the cloud
provider will not further allocate any type-r resource. The
parameter is defined as the minimum occupation rate of all
kinds of resources within slots T, i.e.,
σ = minr∈R
∑
i∈[I]
∑
m∈[M] h
r
imNimxi
CrT
We assume that there are enough cloud users to potentially
exhaust resources within each slot. Thus the resource occupa-
tion rate σ is close to 1.
We design a batch auction algorithm Abatch in Alg. 1 with
container scheduling algorithm Asub in Alg. 2 or Alg. 3,which
can select optimal container scheduling under different circum-
stances. Abatch defines the posted price function and initializes
the primal and dual variables in line 1. Upon the arrival of
ρq users within batch q, we first select the schedule that
maximize users’ utility through the dual oracle(lines 4-6).∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈[si]
f sir(t)κr(t) in line 7 is viewed as the weighted
total resource demand by user i, thus Bi∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈[si]
fs
ir
(t)κr(t)
can be interpreted as the value for a unit resource of user i, and
we select the bid µ with the maximum unit resource value. If
user µ obtains positive utility, we update the primal variable
xµ and dual variable κr(t) according to µ’s schedule sµ (lines
9-16).
Algorithm 1 A Primal-dual Posted Price Auction Abatch
1: Initialize xi = 0, zim(t) = 0, wr(t) = 0, ui = 0, κr(t) =
σFr
k
,
∀i ∈ [I ], r ∈ [R], t ∈ [T ], S ∈ Γi, ψ = ∅;
2: Group a set of ρq users within θ time slots;
3: while ψ 6= ρq do
4: for all i ∈ ρq \ ψ do
5: (ui,Si,costi,{f
S
ir(t)})=Asub({Πi},{Cr},{wr(t)},
{κr(t)});
6: end for
7: µ = argmaxi∈ρq\ψ{
Bi∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈[si]
fsir(t)κr(t)
};
8: if uµ > 0 then
9: xµ = 1;
10: Accept user µ’s bid, allocate resources according to Si, and
charge costi for user i;
11: update: ψ = ψ
⋃
{µ};
12: for all t ∈ Sµ do
13: wr(t) = wr(t) + f
S
µr(t);
14: κr(t) =
σFr
k
( kDr
σFr
)
wr(t)
Cr ,∀r ∈ [R];
15: end for
16: else
17: Reject user µ’s bid, and delete user µ from the set ρq .
18: end if
19: end while
B. Sub-algorithm of Auction Mechanism
Our container scheduling algorithms Asub only selects
utility-maximizing schedules for each job, rather than an
exponential number of schedules. Therefore, we compute a
schedule that minimizes the cost of serving the job.
In our auction mechanism, dependence graph of user tasks
is complicated to handle. We first focus on a relatively
small, yet representative case of jobs from Network Function
Virtualization [30], where each container graph is a service
chain. We exploit the sequential chain structure to design
Asub1 Algorithm 2 with polynomial time complexity, based
on dynamic programming. By choosing time slots that can
ensure right operating sequence and minimum payment for
each sub-task, the first two nested for loops select minimum-
cost schedule for containers (lines 3-10). Then the second for
loop updates the cost and schedule for each container m (lines
11-15); line 17 updates the cost and utility of user i’s schedule
Si at the end.
Container graphs in practice can be more complex than
a chain structure. For general jobs with arbitrary container
graph topology, the container scheduling problem is NP-hard,
as proven in Theorem. 1; we design Asub2 in Algorithm
3 to solve the optimization. Lines 2-8 in Algorithm 3 sort
available time slots by cm(t). Then Asub2 employs Depth-
First Search (DFS) (line 9). We adapt the DFS procedure with
improvements to select available time slots with minimum
cost in a recursive process that decides a container schedule.
Truthfulness requires solving the problem exactly, and our
algorithm runs in exponential time to the number of sub-tasks
in a job, which is mostly small and can be viewed as a constant
in practice.
Theorem 1. In each batch of container based auction, given
Algorithm 2 Asub1: Container Graph Scheduling - Service
Chains
Input: bidding language {Πi}, {Cr},{κr(t)}, {wr(t)};
Output: ui; Si, costi, {f
S
ir(t)};
1: Initialize Si = ∅; f
S
ir(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [T ];
2: for all m ∈ [M ] do
3: for all ts ∈ [θ⌈
ti
θ
⌉+
∑m−1
1 Nim, di −
∑M
m
Nim] do
4: for all te ∈ [ts +Nim, di −
∑M
m+1Nim] do
5: cm(t) =
∑
r∈[R] h
r
imκr(t),∀t ∈ [ts, te];
6: Select Nim slots with minimum cm(t) and wr(t) +
hrim ≤ Cr,∀r ∈ [R] to τm;
7: ∆m = [∆m τm];
8: pm(ts, te)=
∑
t∈τm
cm(t);
9: end for
10: end for
11: for all ts ∈ [θ⌈
ti
θ
⌉+
∑m−1
1 Nim, di −
∑M
m
Nim] do
12: pay = minte<ts{pm−1(:, te)}, τm ∈ [∆m];
13: pm(ts, te) = pm(ts, te) + pay;
14: Si = [Si τm], f
S
ir(t) = f
S
ir(t) + h
r
im;
15: end for
16: end for
17: Update: costi = mints,te(pm(ts, te)); ui = Bi − costi;
fixed resource prices, choosing the schedule of sub-tasks with
minimum cost with a general container graph is NP-hard.
Proof: We construct a polynomial-time reduction to sub-task
scheduling from the classic NP-hard problem subset sum:
maxxi
∑n
i=1 cixi, subject to
∑n
i=1 cixi ≤ V, xi ∈ {0, 1}.
Given a set {c1, c2, ..., cn} and a objective V, our problem
reduces to an instance of K = (|M | = n, hrim = ci,Cr = V ),
in which each user’s job has M types of containers with 1
slot requirement, and the resource pool contains one type of
resource. We should put as many containers in one slot with
lowest price as possible. If a polynomial-time algorithm solves
the capacitated container scheduling problem K , it will solve
the corresponding subset sum problem as well, and vice versa.
Consequently, the subset sum problem can be viewed as a
special case of the sub-task scheduling problem, which must
be NP-hard as well.
Algorithm 3 Asub2: Container Graph Scheduling - General
Topology
Input: bidding language {Πi}, {Cr},{κr(t)}, {wr(t)};
Output: ui; Si, {f
S
ir(t)}, costi;
1: Initialize Si = ∅; f
S
ir(t) = 0, ∀t ∈ [T ]; cmin=INF;
2: for all m ∈ [M ] do
3: for all t ∈ [θ⌈ ti
θ
⌉, di] do
4: cm(t) =
∑
r∈[R] h
r
imκr(t),∀t ∈ [θ⌈
ti
θ
⌉, di];
5: Sort slots with wr(t) + h
r
im ≤ Cr,∀r ∈ [R] according to
cm(t) to τm;
6: pm(ts, te)=
∑
t∈τm
cm(t);
7: end for
8: end for
9: Calling Depth-First Search(m) to find the container schedule
Si and resource allocaton {f
S
ir(t)} with minimum cost cmin;
10: Update: costi = cmin;ui = Bi − costi;
V. ANALYSIS OF AUCTION MECHANISM
A. Truthfulness of The Batch Algorithm
Theorem 2. The batch auction in Algorithm 1 that computes
resource allocation and payment is truthful.
Proof: In Algorithm 1, upon the arrival of user i and our posted
price mechanism, the payment Pi that user i needs to pay to
the cloud provider (if its bid is accepted) depends only on
the amount of resources that has been allocated and user i’s
demand. Which means, user i’s bidding price does not affect
its payment. Therefore, leveraging Lemma 1, our online batch
auction is truthful.
B. Solution feasibility of The Batch Algorithm
Theorem 3. Algorithm 1 computes a feasible solution to ILP
(2).
Proof: xi is initialized to 0 and updated to 1 only (line 10 in
Algorithm Abatch), so the solution of our algorithm is binary
valued, and satisfies constraint (2f). Container scheduling
algorithms Asub1 and Asub2 guarantee that the schedule S
for each user’s bid satisfies constraints (2a), (2b), (2c) and
(2d). For container provisioning and scheduling, both Asub1
and Asub2 select time slots satisfying resource capacity limits,
fSir(t) + wr(t) ≤ Cr, ∃t ∈ [T ]. Hence constraints (2e) is
satisfied. In summary, the solution we obtain is feasible for
ILP (2).
Theorem 4. The computational complexity of Batch Algorithm
1 to ILP(2) is polynomial time.
Proof:
We first consider the case of service chains (Asub = Asub1).
Line 1 in Algorithm 1 takes linear time to initialize the
price function, primal and dual variables. According to user
arrivals, the while loop iterates ρq times to find user µ with
maximum unit resource value, then updates the primal and
dual variables in linear time. In the for loop (lines 4-6),
Algorithm Asub1 iterates ρ
2
q times to select the best schedule
of users with maximum utility. Then each Asub1 in Algorithm
2 takes η = (di − ts −
∑
m∈[M ]Nim)
2 steps to compute the
price of each time slot and examine resource capacity limits
for each container. Thus it takes O(Mη2) to choose the utility
maximization schedule for user i. In summary, the running
time of Abatch with Asub1 is O(Mη
2ρ2q). We next consider
the case of general container graphs (Asub = Asub2). The
complexity of Asub2 is exponential to the number of containers
in the container graph, which is mostly small and an be viewed
as a constant.
C. Competitive Ratio of the Batch Algorithm
The competitive ratio is an upper-bound ratio of the optimal
social welfare achieved by ILP (2) to the social welfare
achieved by our batch algorithm. The primal-dual framework
in our batch algorithm design enables a competitive ratio
analysis based on LP duality theory [29]. Let Pi and Di be
the primal objective value (3) and dual objective value (4)
after accepting user i’s job, respectively. Then we let P0 and
D0 be the initial objective values of primal (3) and dual (4)
programs, and P0 = 0. PI and DI are the final primal and
dual objective values achieved by our algorithm Abatch. Let
OPT1 and OPT2 be the optimal objective values of (2) and (3),
respectively. Since the compact exponential ILP is equivalent
to the original ILP, we have OPT1 = OPT2, which is hereafter
referred to as OPT .
Lemma 2. According to the initial marginal price of each time
slot, the initial dual objective value D0 is at most
1
k
OPT.
Proof: We first show a lower bound on the optimal social
welfare:
OPT ≥ σ
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈[T ] FrCr.
Recall that we let σ denote the minimum resource occupa-
tion rate within slots T. Fr can be interpreted as the minimum
social welfare generated by a job per unit of type-r resource
and per unit of time. Therefore, σ
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈[T ] FrCr is the
minimum social welfare generated by all users.
According to dual (4) and marginal price function (6):
D0 =
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
r∈[R]
Crκr(0) =
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
r∈[R]
Cr(
σFr
k
)
=
1
k
∑
t∈[T ]
∑
r∈[R]
FrCrσ ≤
1
k
OPT
Therefore, the the initial dual objective value D0 is bounded
by 1
k
OPT.
Lemma 3. If there is a constant α > 1, and the primal and
dual objective values increased by handling each user i’s job
satisfy Pi − Pi−1 ≥
1
α
(Di −Di−1), then the batch algorithm
is k
k−1α-competitive.
Proof: Since the inequality is satisfied for all users, we sum
up the inequality of each user i:
PI =
∑
i(Pi − Pi−1) ≥
1
α
∑
i(Di −Di−1) =
1
α
(DI −D0).
According to weak duality and Lemma 2, DI ≥ OPT and
D0 ≥
1
k
OPT. Therefore,
PI ≥
k−1
kα
OPT1 =
k−1
kα
OPT2,
with the fact that P0 = 0. Our batch algorithm is
k
k−1α-
competitive.
Next we will define an Allocation Price Relation to identify
this α. If the Allocation Price Relation is satisfied by α, the
objective values achieved by our algorithm Abatch guarantee
the inequality in Lemma 3.
Definition 1. The Allocation Price Relation for α ≥ 1 is
that κi−1r (t)(w
i
r(t)−w
i−1
r (t)) ≥
1
α
Cr(κ
i
r(t)− κ
i−1
r (t)), ∀i ∈
[I], ∀r ∈ [R], ∀t ∈ [s], where κir(t) represents the price of
type-r resource after processing user i’s job. wir(t) is the total
amount of allocated type-r resource after accepting user i.
Lemma 4. For a given α ≥ 1, if the price function κr(t) satis-
fies κi−1r (t)(w
i
r(t) − w
i−1
r (t)) ≥
1
α
Cr(κ
i
r(t) − κ
i−1
r (t)), ∀i ∈
[I], ∀r ∈ [R], ∀t ∈ [l], then Algorithm Abatch Pi − Pi−1 ≥
1
α
(Di −Di−1), ∀i ∈ [I].
Proof: If bid i is rejected, Pi−Pi−1 = Di−Di−1 = 0. Then
we assume that bid i is accepted and let s be the job schedule
of user i. Knowing that our algorithm accepts a bid when
constraint (4a) is tight, Bis = ui+
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈s f
s
ir(t)κ
i−1
r (t).
So the increase of primal objective is:
Pi − Pi−1 = ui +
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈s κ
i−1
r (t)(w
i
r(t)− w
i−1
r (t))
According to dual (4), the increase of dual objective is:
Di −Di−1 = ui +
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈sCr(κ
i
r(t)− κ
i−1
r (t))
Since we have ui ≥ 0, α ≥ 1 and κ
i−1
r (t)(w
i
r(t) −
wi−1r (t)) ≥
1
α
Cr(κ
i
r(t)− κ
i−1
r (t)):
Pi − Pi−1 = ui +
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈s
κ
i−1
r (t)(w
i
r(t)− w
i−1
r (t))
≥ ui +
1
α
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈s
Cr(κ
i
r(t)− κ
i−1
r (t))
≥
1
α
(ui +
∑
r∈[R]
∑
t∈s
Cr(κ
i
r(t)− κ
i−1
r (t)))
=
1
α
(Di −Di−1)
We next try to find the αr for type-r resource that sat-
isfies the Allocation Price Relationship. Thus the α is the
maximum value among all αr. Since the capacity of type-r
resource is larger than a user demand, we let dwr(t) denote
wir(t)−w
i−1
r (t). We first prepare with the following definition.
Definition 2. The Differential Allocation Price Relation for
Abatch with a given parameter αr ≥ 1 κr(t)dwr(t) ≥
1
αr
Crdκr(t), ∀i ∈ [I], ∀r ∈ [R], ∀t ∈ [s].
Lemma 5. The marginal price defined in (5) satisfies the
Differential Allocation Price Relation, and we can get αr =
ln(kDr
σFr
).
Proof: The derivative of the marginal price function is:
dκr(t) = κ
′
r(wr(t))dwr(t) =
σFr
k
(
kDr
σFr
)
wr(t)
Cr
1
Cr
ln(
kDr
σFr
)dwr(t).
Therefore:
σFr
k
(
kDr
σFr
)
wr(t)
Cr ≥
Cr
αr
σFr
k
(
kDr
σFr
)
wr(t)
Cr
1
Cr
ln(
kDr
σFr
)
≥
1
αr
(
σFr
k
(
kDr
σFr
)
wr(t)
Cr ln(
kDr
σFr
)),⇒ αr ≥ ln(
kDr
σFr
)
Thus we can obtain αr = ln(
kDr
σFr
).
Lemma 6. The batch auction Algorithm Abatch is
k
k−1α-
competitive in social welfare with α = maxr∈[R]ln(
kDr
σFr
).
Proof: Lemma 5 implies that α = maxr∈[R]ln(
kDr
σFr
) satisfies
the Differential Allocation Price Relation of all kinds of
resources. Since the above mentioned, dwr(t) = w
i
r(t) −
wi−1r (t),
dκr(t) = κ
′
r(wr(t))dwr(t) = κ
′
r(wr(t))(w
i
r(t)− w
i−1
r (t))
= κir(t)− κ
i−1
r (t).
Thus, we can obtain α = maxr∈[R]ln(
kDr
σFr
) due to the
Allocation Price Relationship.
Theorem 5. If k satisfies k − 1 = maxr∈[R] ln(
kDr
σFr
) and
k > 1, the competitive ratio of batch auction algorithm is
minimum, and is equal to k.
Proof: We assumpt that ̟ = maxr∈[R](
Dr
σFr
). By Lemma
5, the competitive ratio of our batch algorithm is k
k−1α =
k
k−1 ln(
kDr∗
σFr∗
) = k
k−1 ln(k̟), thus the competitive ratio is a
function of k. Differentiating k
k−1 ln(k̟) on k is:
(
k
k − 1
ln(k̟))
′
=
k − 1− ln(k̟)
(k − 1)2
It suffices to show that (k−1−ln(k̟)(k−1)2 )
′
is positive as k ∈ [1,∝].
When k satisfies k − 1 = ln(k̟) and k > 1, we can obtain
the minimum competitive ratio:
k
k − 1
ln(k̟) =
k
ln(k̟)
ln(k̟) = k.
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Fig. 1: Theoretical Competitive Ratio.
If we consider the case that competition for resource is
intense, the σ is close to 1. When Dr/Fr is 2, the competitive
ratio is close to 2.85, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
D. Setting The Batch Interval θ
In our batch auction, the more jobs we handle in a batch,
the more information we have for social welfare maximization.
Nonetheless, we can’t over-extend the length of a batch given
that cloud jobs have deadlines to meet. Precise optimization of
the job interval length is left as future research, and we provide
here a brief discussion only. Let Wi be the time required to
execute a job i, and ρ be the expected number of user arrivals
per slot. In general, an appropriate length of a batch round
depends on values of Wi, deadline di and arrival time ti of
user i, i ∈ [I]. We can set a target threshold on the job loss rate
(e.g., 10%), the ratio of jobs who cannot meet their deadlines
due to delayed bid admission.
Assume that job processing time and di − ti are normally
distributed, by N(a1, b
2
1) and N(a2, b
2
2), respectively. The
max waiting time for each user equals di − ti −Wi, and is
also normally distributed as N(a1 − a2, b
2
1 + b
2
2). If user i’s
maximum waiting time θi < θ, we will lose this job. Thus the
length of batch interval θ can be set by (for ≤ 10% job loss):
{max θ, s.t.
∑θ
t=1 F (θ) ≤ 0.1, θ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, ...}.}
Where F (θ) is the Normal cumulative distribution function
of θ.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate our batch auction algorithm Abatch and its
sub-algorithms by trace-driven simulation studies. We leverage
Google cluster data [31], which captures rich information on
user jobs, including start time, resource demand (CPU, RAM
and Disk), and duration. We translate cloud job requests into
bids, arriving in a one month time window. We assume that
each sub-task consumes [1,10] slots, and each time slot is one
hour. Job deadlines are set randomly between the arrival time
and system end time. The demand of resources (CPU, RAM
and Disk) is set randomly between [0, 1], with the resource
capacity set to 50. We use user density to express the number
of users in one batch interval, arriving as a Poisson process.
A. Comparison with Classic Online Auctions
We compare our batch auction with a traditional online
auction in terms of social welfare, as shown in Fig. 2. Under
the same simulation settings, we compare the two algorithms
in 10 different sets of simulation studies. Our batch auction
achieves a higher social welfare in all of them. Intuitively, the
online auction processes bids in a FCFS fashion, while the
batch auction considers most attractive bids first in each batch.
Fig. 3 shows another set of comparisons. The superiority of
batch auction remains clear, with different number of time
slots and user density. Social welfare fluctuates with the
increase of the number of users and user density. The batch
auction performs better with higher user density. The influence
of different batch interval θ for the batch performance is
illustrated in Fig. 4. As θ grows, the cloud social welfare
initially grows as well. However, when θ is too large so that
more bids are lost due to delays, as we can see in Fig. 4,
a gradual decrease in the percentage of winners leads to a
decreasing trend in social welfare. Recall that in the analysis
of θ in the previous section, a too large θ is not suitable for
our batch auction.
B. Competitive Ratio of The Batch auction
Next we study the competitive ratio achieved by our batch
auction. As we proved in Theorem 6, the competitive ratio
depends on Dr/σFr. Fig. 5 shows that the competitive ratio
grows as Dr/σFr increases. The observed competitive ratio
is much better than the theoretical bound and remains smaller
than 2; this can be partly explained by the fact that the theoret-
ical bound is a pessimistic worst case scenario uncommon in
practice. The ratio fluctuates with user population and sightly
decreases with as Dr/σFr decreases. The batch auction favors
intensive user arrivals.
C. Performance of Abatch: The Role of System Parameters
We next examine the resource occupation ratio σ (defined in
Sec. III) of our batch auction. As we can see in Fig. 6, under
different numbers of time slots and user density, the resource
occupation ratio of the batch auction mechanism is constantly
beyond 90% and often close to 1. Fig. 7 demonstrates the
variation of social welfare with different number of users. The
social welfare grows mildly but steadily as the number of users
and the number of time slots grow.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work is the first in the cloud computing literature
that studies efficient auction algorithm design for container
services. It is also the first that designs batch online auctions,
aiming at more informed decision making through exploiting
the elastic nature of cloud jobs. We combined techniques from
compact exponential optimization, posted price mechanisms,
and primal-dual algorithms for designing a cloud container
auction that is incentive compatible, computationally efficient,
and economically efficient. As future directions, it will be
interesting to study (i) cloud jobs that cannot be suspended
and resumed; (ii) pre-processing of cloud jobs with tight
deadlines to choose between immediate acceptance or delayed
processing of their bids; and (iii) cloud container auctions that
make revocable decisions, where a partially executed cloud job
may or may not contribute towards social welfare of the cloud.
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